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Abstract
This paper surveys learning to forecast experiments (LtFEs) with human
subjects to test theories of expectations and learning. Subjects must repeat-
edly forecast a market price, whose realization is an aggregation of individual
forecasts. Emphasis is given to how individual forecasting rules interact at
the micro level and which structure they co-create at the aggregate, macro
level. In particular, we focus on the question wether the evidence from lab-
oratory experiments is consistent with heterogeneous expectations.
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1\Recent theoretical work is making it increasingly clear that the multiplicity of equi-
libria ... can arise in a wide variety of situations involving sequential trading, in
competitive as well as ¯nite-agent games. All but a few of these equilibria are, I
believe, behaviorally uninteresting: They do not describe behavior that collections
of adaptively behaving people would ever hit on. I think an appropriate stability
theory can be useful in weeding out these uninteresting equilibria ... But to be use-
ful, stability theory must be more than simply a fancy way of saying that one does
not want to think about certain equilibria. I prefer to view it as an experimentally
testable hypothesis, as a special instance of the adaptive laws that we believe govern
all human behavior" (Lucas, 1986, pp. S424-425).
1 Introduction
Individual expectations about future aggregate outcomes is the key feature that
distinguishes social sciences and economics from the natural sciences. Daily weather
forecasts, either by the public or by experts, do not a®ect the probability of rain.
In contrast, overly optimistic expectations about the economic outlook may have
exaggerated the strong rise in world wide ¯nancial markets in the late 1990s and,
more recently, the excessive growth in housing prices in 2000-2008, while an overly
pessimistic outlook by the public and by economists may have ampli¯ed the recent
¯nancial crisis and deepened the current economic crisis.
Economic decisions today thus depend upon expectations about the future state
of the economy. A theory of individual expectations or market beliefs is therefore a
crucial part of economic theory. The market is an expectations feedback system and
any dynamic economic model depends crucially upon its underlying expectations
hypothesis. But how then should one model individuals who learn from the past
and adapt their behavior as more and more market realizations become available
over time?
Since the seminal works of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972), the Rational Expec-
tations Hypothesis (REH) has become the leading paradigm on expectation forma-
2tion in economics, and rational expectations representative agent models have be-
come the mainstream tool of analysis. In such a framework, all agents are the same
and forecast rationally, using all available information. Rational expectations are
by assumption model consistent and coincide on average with realizations, without
systematic forecasting errors. The rational expectations (RE) approach has im-
portant advantages: it is simple, elegant and puts strong discipline on individual
(forecasting) behavior minimizing the number of free parameters. But drawbacks
of the rational agent paradigm are also well known: it is unrealistic in assuming
perfect knowledge about the economy (typically it assumes knowledge of the law of
motion of the economy) and, even if such knowledge were known, RE requires ex-
tremely strong computing abilities of the agents to compute the equilibrium. Most
importantly, RE models are at odds with empirical observations and behavior in
laboratory experiments wit human subjects and, for example, the decline of world-
wide ¯nancial markets by almost 50% between October 2008 and March 2009 is
hard to reconcile with rational behavior.
Economics, or at least a signi¯cant part of it, is currently witnessing a paradigm
shift to an alternative, behavioral view, where agents are boundedly rational. This
alternative view dates back to Simon (1957) and contains many elements from psy-
chology, e.g. through the work of Tversky and Kahnemann (1974). The need for a
new paradigm in economics has recently been forcefully advocated by Akerlof and
Shiller (2009), Colander et al. (2009) and DeGrauwe (2009). Concerning expecta-
tions of boundedly rational agents, an alternative theory of adaptive learning has
been developed, see e.g. Sargent (1993) for an early and Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) for a more detailed overview. Boundedly rational agents do not know the law
of motion of the economy, but instead use time series observations to form expecta-
tions and adapt their behavior trying to learn model parameters of their perceived
law of motion as more observations become available. Adaptive learning sometimes
enforces convergence to REE, but it may also lead to non-RE equilibria, such as
the learning equilibria in Bullard (1994). Adaptive learning models are sometimes
\cautious modi¯cations of rational expectations theories" (Sargent, 2008, p26) and
3other times large deviations from rationality explaining excess volatility through
expectations driven °uctuations (Grandmont, 1998). Bounded rationality however
also has important drawbacks. In particular, the `wilderness" of bounded ratio-
nality (Sims, 1980) leads to (too) many degrees of freedom and too many free
parameters. There are simply too many ways of modeling non-rational behav-
ior. This \wilderness" of bounded rationality, seems particularly relevant when
individuals have heterogeneous expectations.
A rough estimate indicates that in the past 20 years more than 1000 papers
on bounded rationality and learning have appeared. Among these, in the last
decade hundreds of (theoretical) papers on agent-based models populated with
boundedly rational agents employing heterogeneous strategies/expectations have
appeared, especially with applications in ¯nance; see the comprehensive surveys
of LeBaron (2006) and Hommes (2006) in the Handbook of Computational Eco-
nomics Volume 2: Agent-Based Computational Economics (Tesfatsion and Judd,
2006 and very recent surveys by Hommes and Wagener (2009) and Chiarella et al.
(2009) in the Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics and Evolution (Hens and
Schenk-Hopp¶ e, 2009) as well as papers and references in the Handbook of Economic
Complexity (Rosser, 2009)1. Most of these papers present stylized, theoretical mod-
els or larger, agent-based simulation models, with the realistic feature that these
models can mimic many stylized facts in ¯nancial time series (Lux, 2009) and in
macro data (Delli-Gatti et al., 2008).
The empirical validation of heterogeneity is an important area of current re-
search. For example, Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000) estimate heterogeneous agent
models (HAMs) on hog and beef market data, and found empirical evidence for
heterogeneity of expectations. For the beef market Chavas (2000) estimates that
about 47% of the beef producers behave naively (using only the last price in their
forecast), 18% of the beef producers behaves rationally, whereas 35% behaves quasi-
rationally (i.e. use a univariate autoregressive time series model to forecast prices).
1There is also an extensive literature on heterogeneous belief models based on heterogeneous
information, see e.g. Williams (1977), Shefrin and Statmann (1994), Zapatero (1998), Basak
(2000) and Anderson et al. (2005).
4A number of recent contributions have estimated heterogeneous agent models with
fundamentalists and chartist strategies on stock prices (e.g. Boswijk et al. (2007),
de Jong, Verschoor and Zwinkels (2009), exchange rates (e.g. Gilli and Winker
(2003), Westerho® and Reitz (2003) and several commodities (e.g. gold prices
(Alfarano et al., 2005), and oil prices (ter Ellen and Zwinkels, 2009)). Most of
these studies ¯nd signi¯cant time-variation in the fractions of agents using a mean-
reverting fundamental versus a trend-following strategy. Empirical evidence for
heterogeneous trading strategies in the Spanish Stock Market Exchange has been
found in Vaglica et al. (2008); in particular, Lillo et al. (2008) show that the
investors can be classi¯ed in di®erent groups, including trend followers and con-
trarians, whose change of inventory of the stock is positively respectively negatively
correlated with stock return.
A related, complementary branch of empirical literature uses survey data to
measure individual expectations; see Pesaran and Weale (2006) for a stimulating
overview. An advantage of survey data analysis is that it can focus exclusively on
the expectations-generating process, avoiding the dilemma of testing joint hypothe-
ses. There is quite some evidence on forecasting heterogeneity in survey data. For
example, Frankel and Froot (1987, 1990), Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor and
Allen (1992) already found that ¯nancial experts use di®erent forecasting strate-
gies to predict exchange rates. They tend to use trend extrapolating rules at short
horizons (up to 3 months) and mean-reverting fundamentalists rules at longer hori-
zons (6 months to 1 year) and, moreover, the weight given to di®erent forecasting
techniques changes over time. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) presents evidence of het-
erogeneous beliefs of individual investors about the prospect of the stock market,
while Shiller (2000) ¯nds evidence that investor's sentiment changes over time, with
both institutions and individual investors becoming more optimistic in response to
recent signi¯cant increases of the stock market. Evidence concerning heterogeneity
in survey data on exchange rate expectations can also be found in MacDonald and
Marsh (1996), Elliott and Ito (1999), Prat and Uctum (2000) and B¶ enassy-Qu¶ er¶ e
et al. (2003). Dreger and Stadtmann (2008) show that for exchange rate forecasts
5at a 6 months horizon, di®erent expectations about macroeconomic fundamentals
is what drives heterogeneity. Mankiw et al. (2003) ¯nd evidence for heterogeneity
in in°ation expectations in the Michigan Survey of Consumers and show that the
data are inconsistent with either rational or adaptive expectations, but may be
consistent with a sticky information model. Capistr¶ an and Timmermann (2009)
show that heterogeneity of in°ation expectations of professional forecasters varies
systematically over time, and depends on the level and the variance of current in-
°ation. Pfajfar and Santoro (2009) measure the degree of heterogeneity in private
agents' in°ation forecasts by exploring time series of percentiles from the empirical
distribution of survey data. They show that heterogeneity in in°ation expectations
is pervasive and identify three regions of the distribution corresponding to di®erent
expectations formation mechanisms: a static or highly autoregressive region on the
left hand side of the median, a nearly rational region around the median and a
fraction of forecasts on the right hand side of the median consistent with adaptive
learning and sticky information. Branch (2004, 2007) estimates a simple switch-
ing model with heterogeneous expectations, along the lines of Brock and Hommes
(1997), and provides empirical evidence suggesting that models which allow the
degree of heterogeneity to change over time provide a better ¯t on exchange rate
survey data.
In this paper, we discuss laboratory experiments with human subjects that can
be used to validate expectations hypotheses and learning models. Lucas (1986)
already stressed the importance of laboratory experiments in studying adaptive
learning and its stability (see the quote at the beginning). In particular, we are
interested in the potential role of heterogeneity in expectations. We quote from
Muth (1961, p.321, emphasis added) on expectations heterogeneity and its aggre-
gate e®ect: \Allowing for cross-sectional di®erences in expectations is a simple
matter, because their aggregate a®ect is negligible as long as the deviation from the
rational forecast for an individual ¯rm is not strongly correlated with those of the
others. Modi¯cations are necessary only if the correlation of the errors is large and
depends systematically on other explanatory variables"
6In this paper we discuss learning to forecast experiments (LtFEs) which provide
a controlled laboratory environment to study individual expectations as well as
aggregate outcomes, and investigate questions such as:
² How do individuals form expectations and how do they
bf learn and adapt their behaviour?
² How do individual forecasting rules interact at the micro level and which
aggregate outcome do they co-create at the macro level ?
² Will coordination occur, even when there is limited information, or will het-
erogeneity persist?
² When does learning enforce convergence to REE and when do \learning equi-
libria" arise?
The goals of this paper are twofold. Firstly, we summarize a number of LtFEs
in di®erent market environments. Secondly, we ¯t a theory of heterogeneous ex-
pectations to the experimental data and discuss how well the model explains the
data across di®erent market settings. This poses a particular challenge: is there a
general, perhaps even a universal theory of heterogeneous expectations, that is, can
one come up with one single expectations hypothesis explaining all LtFEs across
di®erent market settings?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related literature on
experiments on expectations. Section 3 discusses an experiment in a cobweb market
modeling framework, while Section 4 describes an asset pricing experiment. Section
5 presents a simple forecasting heuristics switching model, where agents switch
between di®erent forecasting rules based upon their recent performance, and ¯ts
the model to the asset pricing experiments. In Section 6 the same switching model
is ¯tted to experimental data in di®erent market settings, where the only di®erence
comes from the type of expectations feedback, positive versus negative. Section 7
brie°y discusses some recent experiments in a New Keynesian macro setting and
Section 8 concludes.
72 Learning-to-forecast experiments (LtFEs)
Laboratory experiments with human subjects, with full control over the market en-
vironment and economic fundamentals, form an ideal tool to study interactions at
the micro-level and how individual behavior a®ects aggregate market outcomes.
Du®y (2008ab) provides stimulating and up to date surveys of \experimental
macroeconomics". Early work in this area focussed on market mechanisms, such as
double auctions, and the availability of information and futures markets, ensuring
that equilibrium will be reached (e.g. Smith (1962), Plott ad Sunder (1982), Sunder
(1995) and Plott and Smith (20xx)). More recently, unstable market environments
where equilibrium may not be reached, but instead bubbles and crashes may arise
have also been designed (e.g. Smith et al. (1988) and Lei et al. (2001).
In experimental work expectations often plays an indirect or implicit role. How-
ever, in order to avoid joint hypothesis testing there is an expanding literature on
exclusive experimental testing of the expectations hypothesis. An early example
is Schmalensee (1976), who presents subjects with historical data on wheat prices
and asks them to predict the mean wheat price for the next 5 periods. Williams
(1987) considers expectation formation in an experimental double auction market,
which varies from period to period by small shifts in the market clearing price.
Participants predict the mean contract price for 4 or 5 consecutive periods and
the participant with the lowest forecast error earns $1.00. In Dwyer et al. (1993)
and Hey (1994) subjects have to predict a time series generated by an (exogenous)
stochastic process such as a random walk or a simple linear ¯rst order autoregres-
sive process. Kelley and Friedman (2002) consider learning in an Orange Juice
Futures price forecasting experiment, where prices are driven by a linear stochas-
tic process with two exogenous variables (weather and competing supply). But in
these papers there is no expectations feedback, since market realizations are not
a®ected by individual forecasts.
Here, we focus on so-called learning-to-forecast experiments (LtFEs), where sub-
ject's only task is to forecast the price of some commodity for a number, say 50-60,
8periods, with the realized market price in each period determined by (average) in-
dividual expectations. In LtFEs subjects' forecasting decisions are thus separated
from market-trading decisions. The subjects in the experiments do not partici-
pate themselves directly in other market activities, such as trading or producing,
but are forecasters (e.g. advisors to large producers or ¯nancial investors) whose
earnings increase when forecasting errors decrease. At the beginning of each pe-
riod, individual forecasts are collected, which feed directly into (unknown) demand
and/or supply functions and computerized trading yields a market price, derived
from equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply, that becomes available to
the subjects at the end of the period. Demand and supply curves are derived from
maximization of expected utility, pro¯t or wealth and thus consistent with rational
optimizing behavior.
These LtFEs were motivated by the bounded rationality literature, in order to
distinguish between di®erent theories of expectations and learning. Sargent (1993),
for example, emphasizes two di®erent requirements of rational expectations. The
¯rst requirement imposes that individuals maximize an objective function (utility,
pro¯t, wealth, etc.) subject to perceived constraints, while the second requirement
imposes mutual consistency of these perceptions. Marimon and Sunder (1994)
were the ¯rst to set up experiments testing individual rationality and mutual con-
sistency either jointly or separately and used di®erent experimental designs to dis-
tinguish between \learning-to-optimize" versus \learning-to-forecast" experiments
(Marimon and Sunder, 1994, p.134). The LtFEs focus exclusively on the role of
expectations, using computerized optimal individual demand and supply schedules
once these individual forecasts have been made.
In LtFEs, subjects typically only have qualitative information about the market.
They know that the price pt is an aggregation of individual forecasts, derived
from equilibrium between demand and supply and are able to infer the type of
expectations feedback, positive or negative. Positive (negative) feedback means
that an increase of (average) individual forecasts leads to a higher (lower) market
equilibrium price. Positive feedback is important in speculative asset markets,
9Figure 1: Typical computerscreen in Learning to Forecast Experiment
where higher market expectations lead to an increase of speculative demand and
therefore an increase of the realized asset price. Negative feedback may be dominant
in supply driven commodity markets, where an increase in expected prices leads to
higher production and thus to a lower realized market price. Subjects in the LtFEs
know past prices and their own past forecasts and earnings, typically in table as
well as in graphic form, as illustrated by an example in Figure 1. They do however
not know the forecasts of other participants, the exact market equilibrium equation,
the exact demand and supply schedules and the exact number of other demanders
and/or suppliers in the market. The type of information in the experiment is thus
very similar to models of bounded rationality and adaptive learning, were agents
try to learn a perceived law of motion, based upon time series observations without
knowing the underlying actual law of motion of the market.
Quite a number of LtFEs have appeared in the literature. In a series of papers,
Marimon, Spear and Sunder studied expectation formation in in°ationary overlap-
ping generations economies. Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) ¯nd experimental
evidence for expectationally driven cycles and coordination of beliefs on a sunspot
2-cycle equilibrium, but only after agents have been exposed to exogenous shocks of
a similar kind. Marimon and Sunder (1995) present experimental evidence that a
\simple" rule, such as a constant growth of the money supply, can help coordinate
agents' beliefs and help stabilize the economy. More recently, a number of LtFEs
within other macro economic frameworks have been performed. Adam (2007) uses
10a simple model of sticky prices and shows that a restricted perception equilibrium
explains the experimental data better than the RE benchmark solution. Pfajfar
and Santoro (2009) and Assenza et al. (2009) run LtFEs in a new Keynesian frame-
work. Pfajfar and Santoro (2009) ¯nd evidence for heterogeneity of expectations
in their experimental data and three di®erent types of forecasting rules: simple
heuristics (e.g. trend following rules), adaptive learning and rational expectations.
The LtFEs of Assenza et al. (2009) will be brie°y discussed in Section 7.
A learning to forecast experiment may be seen as a test bed for the expectations
hypothesis in a benchmark model, assuming that all other assumptions such as
rational, utility and pro¯t maximizing behavior are satis¯ed. A learning to forecast
experiment thus provides clean data on individual expectations as well as aggregate
price behavior. Here we will discuss learning to forecast experiments, based on three
benchmark models: (1) the cobweb model, (2) a standard asset pricing model and



















H;t+1): New Keynesian (2.3)
In the cobweb LtFE experiments in Hommes al. (2007), the realized market price
pt in (2.1) is a (nonlinear) function of all individual one-period ahead forecasts pe
h;t.
In the asset pricing LtFE in Hommes et al. (2005a, 2008) the realized market price
pt in (2.2) is a (nonlinear) function of all two-period ahead individual forecasts
pe
h;t+1 of next periods price pt+1. There is another important di®erence between
the cobweb and the asset pricing LtFEs: negative versus positive expectations
feedback. Positive feedback means that the realized market price increases, when
an individual price forecast increases. This feature is characteristic of speculative
asset markets, where an increase of the price forecast leads to higher demand for
the asset and therefore to higher market prices; mathematically it means that the
map F in (2.2) is an increasing function of individual forecasts. Negative feedback
11prevails in supply driven markets, where a higher expected price leads to increased
production and thus a lower realized market price; the map F in (2.1) underlying
the cobweb experiments is decreasing in individual forecasts. In Section 6 we
review the LtFE of Heemeijer et al. (2009), comparing positive versus negative
feedback systems. Despite the fact that the only di®erence is the sign (positive
versus negative) of the coe±cient in the linear price-expectations feedback rule,
the aggregate price behaviors and individual expectations turn out to be rather
di®erent.
Finally, in the New Keynesian macro model expectations on two di®erent vari-
ables interact and realized in°ation ¼t and realized output gap yt in (2.3) simul-
taneously depend (linearly) on all two-period ahead individual forecasts of both
in°ation and the output gap. In Section 7 we will brie°y discuss the LtFE of As-
senza et al. (2009), where the dynamics of in°ation and the output gap is driven
simultaneously by individual expectations of both in°ation and the output gap.
3 Cobweb Experiments
In this section we discuss LtFE in the classical cobweb framework. This is exactly
the same framework employed in the seminal paper of Muth (1961) introducing
rational expectations. These cobweb LtFEs may thus be seen as a direct test
of the REH in the cobweb model, assuming all other modeling assumptions (e.g.
producers' pro¯t maximization and consumers utility maximization) are satis¯ed.
Carlson (1967) already conducted hand-run experiments with subjects as cobweb
suppliers. Holt and Villamil (1986) and Hommes et al. (2000) conducted individual
cobweb experiments, where price °uctuations are induced by decisions of a single
individual. Wellford (1989) conducted several computerized cobweb experiments,
where market prices were determined by subjects quantity decisions.
Here we focus on the LtFEs in Hommes et al. (2007) with K = 6 participants
per session. The participants were asked to predict next period's price of a com-
modity under limited information on the structural characteristics of the market.
12Participants were only informed about the basic principles of the cobweb-type mar-
ket. They were advisors to producers, whose only job is to accurately forecast the
price of the good for 50 subsequent periods. Pay-o®s were de¯ned as a quadratic
function of squared forecasting errors, truncated at 0:2






Participants were informed that the price would be determined by market clearing
and that it would have to be within the range [0;10]. Furthermore, they knew that
there was (negative) feedback from individual price forecasts to realized market
price in the sense that if their forecast would increase, the supply would increase
and consequently the market clearing price would decrease. Subjects however did
not know how large these feedback e®ects would be, as they had no knowledge of
underlying market equilibrium equations. Subjects thus had qualitative information
about the market, but no quantitative details.
The realized price pt in the experiments was determined by the (unknown)








i;t the price forecast of participant i at time t. Demand was exogenously
given by a simple linear schedule:
D(pt) = a ¡ dpt + ´t (3.3)
with ´t a small stochastic shock drawn from a Normal distribution representing
small random demand °uctuations. Supply S(pe






i;t ¡ 6)) + 1: (3.4)
21300 points corresponded to 0:5 Euro, so that maximum earnings were 25 Euro's. Average
earnings ranged from 11:5 to 21 Euro (in about 1:5 hours), over the di®erent treatments.
13This increasing, nonlinear supply schedule can be derived from producer's expected
pro¯t maximization with a convex cost function. Subjects in the experiment thus
do not participate themselves in production decisions, but supply is computed as
if each individual producer maximizes expected pro¯t, given his/her individual
price forecast. The parameter ¸ tunes the nonlinearity of the supply curve and















where ²t = ´t=d. Given the parameters a;d and ¸ the aggregate realized price pt
depends on individual price expectations as well as the realization of the (small)
stochastic shocks. While the parameters of the demand function and the realiza-
tions of the noise component remained unchanged across all treatments at a = 13:8,
d = 1:5 and ²t =
´t
d » N(0;0:5), the slope parameter of the supply function was
varied. Here we consider two treatments. A stable treatment had ¸ = 0:22, for
which under naive expectations the price converges quickly to the rational expec-
tations equilibrium. In another strongly unstable treatment, with ¸ = 2, under
naive expectations the RE price is unstable and prices converge to a 2-cycle, as
illustrated in Fig. 2. Along the 2-cycle producers are \irrational" in the sense
that they make systematic forecasting errors, predicting a high (low) price when
realized market price will be low (high).
Under rational expectations, all individuals would predict the unique price p¤,
at which demand and supply intersect. Given that all individuals have rational
expectations, realized prices will be given by
pt = p
¤ + ²t; (3.6)
that is, small random °uctuations around the RE steady state. Given the limited
market information one can not expect that all individuals have rational expecta-
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Figure 2: Cobweb dynamics in the strongly unstable treatment in two benchmark
simulations. Left Panel: convergence to a (noisy) 2-cycle under naive expecta-
tions. Right Panel: convergence to (noisy) RE equilibrium price under learning by
average.
individuals would learn to have rational expectations. For example, if price expecta-
tions are given by the sample average of past prices, convergence to the RE-price is
enforced, as illustrated in Fig. 2 (right panel). The LtFE has in fact been designed
to test whether individuals are able to learn from their systematic mistakes under
naive expectations and coordinate on a learning algorithm enforcing convergence
to the RE steady state.
Figure 3 shows time series of realized market prices together with the individual
forecasts (top panels) as well as the average forecast (middle panels) for two typical
experimental groups, one stable treatment (left panels) and one strongly unstable
treatment (right panels). An immediate observation is that in the stable treatment,
after a short learning phase of about 10 periods, the price volatility is low and in-
dividual forecasts as well as average forecasts are very close to the RE benchmark,
with price °uctuations entirely driven by the small random shocks in the exper-
iments. Aggregate price behaviour and individual forecasts are very di®erent in
the strongly unstable treatment. Realized prices exhibit large °uctuations, while
individual forecasts are very volatile, even towards the end of the experiment. The
bottom panel of ¯gure 3 shows the degree of heterogeneity, as measured by the stan-
dard deviations of individual forecasts (6 individuals) averaged over the six groups,
in the stable respectively the strongly unstable treatments. In the stable treatment
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Figure 3: Cobweb Learning to Forecast Experiments Top Panels: stable: coordi-
nation on RE unstable: persistent heterogeneity Middle Panels: Bottom Panels:
degree of heterogeneity measured by standard deviations of individual forecasts (6
individuals) averaged over the six groups in each treatment.
a forecast close to the RE-benchmark steady state. In the strongly unstable treat-
ment heterogeneity decreases somewhat over time, but only slowly, and remains
at least 3 times as high as in the stable treatment. Hence, in the classical cob-
web framework used in Muth (1961) to introduce rational expectations, our LtFEs
show that only in the stable cobweb case, the interaction of individual forecasting
rules enforces convergence to the RE-benchmark. In the unstable treatment, het-
erogeneity in forecasting is persistent and leads to an aggregate e®ect upon prices
characterized by excess volatility.
The behaviour in Figure 3 is typical for all cobweb experiments. Hommes et
16al. (2007) summarize the stylized facts of the cobweb LtFE experiments as follows:
(1) the sample mean of realized prices is close to the RE benchmark p¤ in all
treatments; (2) the sample variance of realized prices depends on the treatment: it
is close to the RE benchmark in the stable treatment, but signi¯cantly higher in
the unstable treatment; (3) realized market prices are irregular and do not exhibit
signi¯cant linear autocorrelations.
These stylized facts across di®erent treatments appear hard to explain by stan-
dard learning mechanisms o®ered by the theoretical literature. For example, naive
expectations are inconsistent with the experiments, because in the unstable treat-
ment it predicts too much regularity (convergence to a 2-cycle) in aggregate price
behavior. Average price expectations, which is just the simplest form of adaptive
learning obtained when regressing prices on a constant, also are inconsistent with
the experiments, because for both treatment it predicts convergence to the RE-
benchmark (see Fig. 2, right panel). Hommes (2009) discusses a number of other
homogeneous learning algorithms and concludes that heterogeneity in forecasting
rules is needed to explain the stylized facts of the cobweb experiments across dif-
ferent treatments. Apparently, the interaction of agents' individual forecasting
rules washes out linear predictability in aggregate price behavior. In the stable
treatment, this interaction leads to coordination on the \correct" RE benchmark
steady state, but in the unstable treatment heterogeneity persists and prices are
excessively volatile.
Hommes and Lux (2009) present a model of heterogenous individual learning
via genetic algorithms (GAs) to explain the cobweb LtFEs3. Genetic algorithms
require a functional speci¯cation of the forecasting rule, whose ¯tness-maximizing
parameter values are searched for via the evolutionary algorithm. Hommes and
Lux (2009) use a simple ¯rst order autoregressive rule:
p
e
i;t+1 = ®i + ¯i(pt ¡ ®i): (3.7)
3Colucci and Valori (2006) ¯t simple adaptive learning rules to the individual cobweb LtFE of
Hommes et al. (2000). Arifovic (1994) calibrates a GA-learning model to the cobweb experiments
of Wellford (1989).
17Figure 4: Simulated prices and learning parameters.
Such a ¯rst order autoregressive (AR1) rule seems a natural forecasting scheme
as agents could implement it using the sample average as their estimate of ®i and
the ¯rst order sample autocorrelation as the estimate of ¯i
4. Moreover, the AR1
forecasting rule (3.7) has a simple behavioral interpretation, with ®i representing an
anchor or observed average price level around which the market price °uctuates, and
¯i representing the observed persistence or anti-persistence of price °uctuations5.
Hommes and Lux (2009) show that the interaction of individual GA-learning
rules simultaneously reproduces all stylized facts in aggregate price behaviour ob-
served in the experiments across the di®erent treatments. Figure ?? shows typical
price time series under GA-learning as well as time series of the two parameters
in the AR1 forecasting rule for the stable treatment (left panel) and the strongly
unstable treatment (right panel). In the stable treatment the parameters converge
to a neighborhood of the RE benchmark, consistent with the observed coordi-
4See Hommes and Sorger (1998), where the parameters of an AR1 rule are updated according
to sample autocorrelation learning.
5In similar cobweb LtFE experiments Heemeijer et al. (2009) recently estimated individual
forecasting rules, and many individuals actually used forecasting rules of the simple AR1-form
(3.7).
18nation of individual forecasts in the experiments, while in the strongly unstable
treatment parameters continue to °uctuate and prices keep moving away from the
RE-benchmark, consistent with the persistent heterogeneity in the strongly unsta-
ble treatment of the experiments (cf. Fig. 3).
4 Asset Pricing Experiment
Before discussing the asset pricing Learning-to-forecast experiments (LtFEs) in
Hommes et al. (2005), we brie°y discuss the underlying benchmark model.
4.1 An asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs
This section discusses a standard one-period asset pricing model, extended to the
case with heterogeneous beliefs, as in Campbell et al. (1997) and Brock and
Hommes (1998). Agents can either invest in a risk free or in a risky asset. The risk
free asset is in perfect elastic supply and pays a ¯xed rate of return r; the risky
asset pays an uncertain dividend. Let pt be the price per share (ex-dividend) of
the risky asset at time t, and let yt be the stochastic dividend process of the risky
asset. Next period's wealth is given by
Wt+1 = RWt + (pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt)zt; (4.1)
where R = 1 + r is the gross rate of risk free return and zt denotes the number of
shares of the risky asset purchased at date t. Let Eht and Vht denote the `beliefs' or
forecasts of trader type h about conditional expectation and conditional variance.
Agents are assumed to be myopic mean-variance maximizers so that the demand





19where a is the risk aversion parameter. The demand zht for risky assets by trader
type h is then
zht =
Eht[pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt]
aVht[pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt]
=
Eht[pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt]
a¾2 ; (4.3)
where the conditional variance Vht = ¾2 is assumed to be equal for all types and
constant.6 Let zs denote the supply of outside risky shares per investor, assumed
to be constant, and let nht denote the fraction of type h at date t. Equilibrium of




Eht[pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt]
a¾2 = z
s; (4.4)
where H is the number of di®erent trader types. The forecasts Eht[pt+1 + yt+1]
of tomorrows prices and dividends are made before the equilibrium price pt has
been revealed by the market and therefore will depend upon a publically available
information set It¡1 = fpt¡1;pt¡2;:::;yt¡1;yt¡2;:::g of past prices and dividends.






nhtEht[pt+1 + yt+1] ¡ a¾
2z
s: (4.5)
The quantity a¾2zs may be interpreted as a risk premium for traders to hold all
risky assets. I te experimets discussed below, zs = 0 so tat (4.5) correspods to te
case of risk-eutral ivestors. Moreover, it will be assumed divideds are IID, wit mea
¹ y, ad all traders ave correct expectatios about divideds, Eht[yt+1] = Et[yt+1] = ¹ y,






nhtEht[pt+1] + ¹ y: (4.6)
6Gaunersdorfer (2000) studies the case with time varying beliefs about variances and Chiarella
and He (2002,2003) investigate the model with heterogeneous risk aversion coe±cients.
204.2 Experimental Design
In the asset pricing LtFEs six subjects are forecast advisors to large pension funds.
Subjects only task is to forecast the price of a risk asset for 50 periods and, based
on this forecast, the pension fund ten decides how much to invest in the risky asset
according to the mean-variance demand function (4.3). The realized asset price in





(1 ¡ nt) ¹ pe
t+1 + nt p
f + ¹ y + "t
´
where pf = ¹ y=r is the fundamental price, ¹ pe
t+1 is the average two-period ahead
price forecast over six individuals and "t are small shocks, e.g. representing small
random °uctuations in asset demand7. Since the mean-dividend ¹ y and the interest
rate r are known to the subjects, they can in principle use these to compute the
fundamental price and use it in their forecast. The fraction nt in (4.7) is the share
of computerized fundamental robot traders, given by







The fraction of robot traders increases as the price moves further away from the
fundamental benchmark. The fundamental trader thus acts as a \far from equilib-
rium" stabilizing force in the market, mimicking the feature that more traders in
the market expect the price to return in the direction of the fundamental when the
deviations becomes large8. Subjects' earnings depend on forecasting performance















7Bottazzi et al. (2008) consider asset pricing LtFEs were, in addition to a price forecast
subjects must also forecast the variance of excess returns, which is then used in the mean-variance
demand function (4.3) to compute the market clearing price.
8In the experiment nt never exceeds 0:25, while the weight of the other traders are equal to
(1¡nt)=6. Hommes et al. (2008) investigate price behavior in asset pricing LtFEs without robot
traders.
























































Figure 5: Simulation benchmarks: Top Panels RE (left) and naive (right); Bottom
Panels: average expectations (left) ad AR2 trend following rule pe
t+1 = (60 +
pt¡1)=2 + (pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2).
so that forecasting errors exceeding 7 would result in no reward at a given pe-
riod. At the end of the session the accumulated earnings of every participant were
converted to euros (1 point computed as in (4.8) corresponded to 50 cents).
4.3 Benchmark Simulations
Fig. 5 shows the simulation of realized prices, which would occur for a number of
homogeneous benchmark expectations rules. When all individuals use the rational,
fundamental forecasting rule, pe
i;t+1 = ¹ y=r = pf, for all i and t, the realized price
pt = "t=(1 + r) randomly °uctuates around the fundamental level pf = 60 with
small amplitude, due to the small socks. In the experiment, one can not expect
rational behavior at the outset, but aggregate prices might converge to their fun-
damental value through individual learning. Under naive expectations the price
slowly converges towards its fundamental value. The same is true under average
expectations, the simplest form of adaptive learning obtained when regressing the
price on a constant, but the convergence is extremely slow. If all subjects would






+ (pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2); (4.9)
price oscillations as illustrated in the bottom right panel of Fig. 5 arise. This is
an example of an anchoring and adjustment rule, which plays an important role in
psychology (Tversky ad Kahneman, 1974), because it extrapolates the last price
change from a reference point or anchor (pf + pt¡1)=2 describing the \long-run"
price level9.
4.4 Experimental Results
Fig. 6 shows time series of prices, individual predictions and forecasting errors
in six di®erent markets of the experiment. A striking feature of aggregate price
behavior is that three di®erent qualitative patterns emerge. The prices in groups
2 and 5 converge slowly and almost monotonically to the fundamental price level.
In groups 1 and 6 persistent oscillations are observed during the entire experiment.
In groups 4 and 7 prices are also °uctuating but their amplitude is decreasing.10
A second striking result concerns individual predictions. In all groups partic-
ipants were able to coordinate their forecasting activity. The forecasts, as shown
in the lower parts of the panels in Fig. 7, are dispersed in the ¯rst periods but
then become very close to each other in all groups. The coordination of individual
forecasts has been achieved in the absence of any communication between subjects
and knowledge of past and present predictions of other participants.
Figure 7 (right panel) illustrates the degree of heterogeneity, as measured by
the standard deviation of individual forecasts, in three di®erent groups. A ¯rst
9At this stage one could argue that the anchor of this rule, de¯ned as the average between the
last observed price and the fundamental price, was unknown in the experiment, since subjects
were not provided explicitly with the fundamental price. It is remarkable however that for a
number of subjects the linear estimated forecasting rule was surprisingly close to the anchor and
adjustment rule (4.9)
10Price dynamics in group 3 (not shown, but see the concluding remarks) is more di±cult to
classify. Similar to group 1 it started with moderate oscillations, then stabilized at a level below















































































































































































Figure 6: Asset Pricing Experiments: realized market prices, six individual pre-
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Figure 7: Left Panels: prices for laboratory experiments in three di®erent groups.
Lower parts of left panels show individual predictions and forecasting errors (in-
ner frames). Right Panels : Evolution of the degree of heterogeneity as measured
by the standard deviation of individual forecasts in corresponding groups.
25observation is that for each of the three groups, there is considerable time varia-
tion in the degree of heterogeneity. In the converging group 2 heterogeneity quickly
decreases, to a level below 1 after period 15 and close to 0 after period 25. It should
be noted that despite the fact that coordination is quick, prices are not close to the
fundamental value. Hence, coordination on the \wrong", non-fundamental price
occurs. In the oscillating group 1, heterogeneity °uctuates, with stronger coordina-
tion (i.e. a smaller degree of heterogeneity) during trends and weaker coordination
during trend reversals. The same features, but in a more extreme form, arise in the
dampened oscillation group 4. During the strong trend from periods 4 ¡ 13 coor-
dination is very strong, with the degree of heterogeneity falling from a initial level
above 150 to values less than 5. Thereafter, coordination weakens and the degree
of heterogeneity peaks at price trend reversals, becomes very high after period 23
(note the scale on the vertical axis) with an extremely high peak around period
36-37. Note that, as heterogeneity increases, the asset price stabilizes.
To summarize, in the asset pricing LtFEs we observe the following stylized facts:
1 participants were unable to learn the rational, fundamental price; only in
some cases individual predictions moved (slowly) in the direction of the fun-
damental price towards the end of the experiment;
2 alltough the sessions were designed in exactly the same, three di®erent price
patterns were observed: (i) slow, (almost) monotonic convergence, (ii) persis-
tent price oscillations with almost constant amplitude, and (iii) large initial
oscillations dampening slowly towards the end of the experiment;
3 already after a short transient, participants were able to coordinate their
forecasting activity, submitting similar forecasts in every period.
One would like to have a model explaining all these stylized facts simultaneously.
We have not bee able to come up wit a homogeneous expectations model ¯tting
all these experiments. The fact that qualitatively di®erent aggregate outcomes can
arise suggests that path dependence and heterogeneous expectations play a key role.
265 A Heterogeneous Expectations Model
In the last 15 years a large literature on heterogenous agent models has developed,
as surveyed e.g. by Hommes (2006) ad LeBaron(2006). In particular, Brock ad
Hommes (1997) introduced a heterogeneous expectations model, where agents tend
to switch towards forecasting strategies that have performed better in the recent
past. Here we discuss a modi¯ed version, a heuristics switching model, which has
recently been ¯tted to the asset pricing LtFEs by Anufriev and Hommes (2009)11.
Agents can choose from a number of simple forecasting heuristics. To discipline
the wilderness of bounded rationality, the set of forecasting heuristics needs to be
carefully chosen. We will choose forecasting heuristics that are similar to those
obtained from estimations of linear models on individual forecasting data in the
LtFEs in Hommes et al. (2005) and Heemeijer et al. (2009). To further disci-
pline the wilderness of bounded rationality two forms of individual learning are
introduced. First, for some heuristics adaptive learning takes place, tat is, some
parameters of the heuristics are updated over time. Second, evolutionar selection
or performance based reinforcement learning takes place, that is, agents evaluate
the performances of all heuristics, and tend to switch to more successfully rules.
Hence, the impact of each of the rules is evolving over time.
To keep the model as simple as possible, Anufriev and Hommes (2009) restricted
attention to only four forecasting heuristics:
ADA p
e





2;t+1 = pt¡1 + 0:4(pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2) (5.2)
STR p
e







+ (pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2); (5.4)
11The heuristics switching model is similar to other models of reinforcement learning, e.g. Erev
and Roth (1998) and Camerer and Ho (1999). An important di®erence however is that our
model is built in a market environment rather than the strategic environments usually studied
in standard game theory. Another related work is Arifovic and Ledyard (2008), who present a
new behavioral model of individual learning in repeated situations and validate the model with
experimental data. Schunk (2009) introduces a dynamic model of behavioral heterogeneity in
search behavior and shows that his experimental data is well explained by a model assuming




j=0 pj is the sample average of past prices. The ¯rst adaptive expec-
tations (ADA) rule predicts that the price is a weighted average of the last observed
price pt¡1 and the last price forecast pe
t. This ADA rule was obtained as the esti-
mated linear rule of a number of subjects in the converging groups 2 and 5. The
second and the third rules are both trend following rules, with a weak trend (WTR)
parameter 0:4 and a strong trend (STR) parameter 1:3 respectively12. These rules
were obtained as the estimated linear rules for quite a number of subjects in the
oscillatory markets 1, 4, 6 and 7, with 0:4 ad 1:3 obtained as the smallest and
largest trend extrapolating coe±cients. Finally, the fourth rule is an anchor and
adjustment rule, obtained from the linear AR2 rule (4.9), discussed in subsection
4.3, by replacing the (unknown) fundamental price pf by a proxy given by the
(observable) sample average of past prices pav
t¡1. The weight coe±cient of the ADA
rule and the trend parameters of trend following rules have been ¯xed and it ap-
pears that the simulations below are robust with respect small changes of these
parameters. The LAA rule exhibits a simple form of adaptive learning, since the
anchor of the rule is the average of the last observed price and the sample average
of all observed prices.
Subjects switch between the di®erent forecasting rules based upon quadratic
forecasting errors, consistent with the earnings incentives in the experiments. The






¢2 + ´ Ui;t¡2 (5.5)
where the parameter ´ 2 [0;1] measure the strength of the agents' memory. Switch-
ing is described by a discrete choice model with asynchronous updating





12Haruvy et al. (2007) also provide experimental evidence that individual price expectations
are signi¯cantly a®ected by past price trends. Trend following behavior is often associated with
technical trading strategies in real ¯nancial markets; see Menkho® and Taylor for a comprehensive
overview of the importance of technical analysis.
28In the special case ± = 0, (5.6) reduces to the the discrete choice model with
synchronous updating used in Brock and Hommes (1997). The more general case,
0 · ± · 1, gives some persistence or inertia in the impact of rule h, re°ecting the
fact (consistent with the experimental data) that not all the participants update
their rule in every period or at the same time (see Hommes et al., 2005b and Diks
and van der Weide, 2005). Hence, ± may be interpreted as the average per period
fraction of individuals who stick to their previous strategy. In the extreme case
± = 1, the initial impacts of the rules never change; if 0 < ± · 1, in each period
a fraction 1 ¡ ± of participants update their rule according to the discrete choice
model. The parameter ¯ ¸ 0 represents the intensity of choice measuring how
sensitive individuals are to di®erences in strategy performance. The higher the
intensity of choice ¯, the faster individuals will switch to more successful rules.
In the extreme case ¯ = 0, the impacts in (5.6) move to an equal distribution
independent of their past performance. At the other extreme ¯ = 1, all agents
who update their heuristic (i.e., a fraction 1 ¡ ±) switch to the most successful
predictor.
In all simulations below, we ¯x the parameters at the benchmark values ¯ =
0:4;´ = 0:7;± = 0:913 and the initial fractions of the four strategies are equal,
i.e. nht = 0:25. The simulations thus only di®er in their initial prices, which
have been chosen exactly the same as in the ¯rst two periods in the corresponding
experimental group
Fig. 8 compares the experimental data with the one-step ahead predictions
made by the heuristics switching model, for one converging group (group 5), one
oscillating group (group 6) and one dampened oscillating group (group 7); the
other groups yield very similar results; see Anufriev and Hommes (2009). Fig. 8
suggests that the switching model with four heuristics ¯ts the experimental data
quite nicely. The one-step ahead predictions of the nonlinear switching model in
Fig. 8 use past experimental price data to determine the forecasts and the fractions
13These values have been obtained in Anufriev and Hommes (2009) after some trial and error
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Fractions of 4 rules in the simulation for Group 7
ADA WTR STR LAA
Figure 8: Left Panels: prices for laboratory experiments in di®erent groups (red)
with corresponding one-step ahead predictions of the evolutionary model (blue).
Lower parts of left panels show predictions and forecasting errors (inner frames)
of four heuristics. Right Panels : Evolution of heuristic impacts during the one-
step ahead predictions of the model. Fractions of four forecasting heuristics: adaptive
expectations (ADA, purple), weak trend followers (WTR, black), strong trend followers
(STR, blue) and anchoring adjustment heuristic (LAA, red).
30of the strategies at each period t, i.e., the model simulation uses exactly the same
information that was available to participants in the experiments. An immediate
observations by comparing these simulations is that the one-period ahead forecasts
can easily follow the di®erent patterns in aggregate price behavior, slow monotonic
convergence, sustained oscillations as well as dampened oscillations.
The right panels in Fig. 8 show the corresponding fractions of the four strate-
gies for each group. In di®erent groups di®erent heuristics are taking the lead
after starting from a uniform distribution. In the monotonically converging group,
the impact of the di®erent rules stays more or less equal, although the impact of
adaptive expectations gradually increases and slightly dominates the other rules in
the last 25 periods. The oscillatory group yields similar results as, with the LAA
rule dominating the market early and its impact increasing to about 90% towards
the end of the experiment. Finally, for the group with the dampened oscillations,
one step ahead forecast produces a rich evolutionary selection dynamics (bottom
panel), with three di®erent phases where the STR, the LAA and the ADA heuristics
subsequently dominate. The STR dominates during the initial phase of a strong
trend in prices, but starts declining after it misses the ¯rst turning point of the
trend. The LAA does a better job in predicting the trend reversal and its impact
starts increasing. The LAA takes the lead in the second phase of the experiment,
with oscillating prices. But the oscillations slowly dampen and therefore, after pe-
riod 35, the impact of adaptive expectations, which has been the worst performing
rule until that point, starts increasing and adaptive expectations dominates the
groups in the last 9 periods.
6 Positive versus Negative Feedback Experiments
Aggregate price behavior in the cobweb and the asset pricing LtFEs are quite dif-
ferent. While in the cobweb framework the price °uctuates around its fundamental
value, with a sample average of realized prices very close to the RE price, in the as-
set pricing experiments persistent deviations from the fundamental price with long
31lasting under- or over-valuations have been observed. A key di®erence between
the cobweb and asset pricing experiments is the type of feedback: the asset pricing
(cobweb) framework exhibits positive (negative) feedback, that is the realized price
depends positively (negatively) on the average price forecast. In the case of posi-
tive (negative) feedback, when an individual forecast increases, the realized market
price goes up (down). A natural question then is whether the type of feedback,
positive versus negative, explains these di®erences in aggregate behavior.
In most markets both types of feedback may play a role. Positive feedback
however, seems particularly relevant in speculative asset markets. If many agents
expect the price of an asset to rise they will start buying the asset, aggregate de-
mand will increase and so, by the law of supply and demand, will the asset price.
High price expectations thus become self-con¯rming and lead to high realized asset
prices. In markets where the role of speculative demand is less important, e.g. in
markets for non-storable commodities, negative feedback may play a more promi-
nent role. Consider e.g. a supply-driven commodity market. If many producers
expect future prices to be high they will increase production which, according to
the law of supply and demand, will lead to a low realized market price.
Heemeijer et al. (2009) investigate how the expectations feedback structure
a®ects individual forecasting behaviour and aggregate market outcomes by consid-
ering market environments that only di®er in the sign of the expectations feedback,
but are equivalent along all other dimensions. In this section we discuss these ex-
periments and apply the heterogeneous expectations model of Section 5 to see
whether it can explain the di®erent aggregate outcomes.
The distinction between positive and negative expectation feedback is related
to the concepts of strategic complements versus strategic substitutes. Haltiwanger
and Waldman (1985) argue that when actions are strategic complements, agents
have an incentive to imitate other agents. This is the case in an asset market, where
predicting a price close to the predictions of the other participants turns out to be
most pro¯table. However, coordination of predictions enhances the impact of the
irrational participants upon realized prices and convergence to the rational equilib-
32rium price becomes unlikely. When actions are strategic substitutes, agents have
an incentive to deviate from what other agents are doing. This is the case in nega-
tive feedback markets, where agents have an incentive to predict high (low) prices
when the majority predicts prices below (above) the equilibrium price. The impact
of irrational individuals will be limited and convergence to the equilibrium price is
more likely. Coordination of predictions will only take place after convergence.
In recent experiments Fehr and Tyran (2001, 2005, 2007) study the impact of
di®erent strategic environments (strategic complementarity versus strategic sub-
stitutability) on individual rationality and aggregate outcomes. Strategic substi-
tutability (complementarity) prevails if an increase in the action of individual i
generates an incentive for j to decrease (increase) his action. Fehr and Tyran
study the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated money shock in a price
setting game with positively (complements) or negatively sloped (substitutes) reac-
tion curves, and ¯nd much faster convergence in the case of substitutes. Sutan and
Willinger (2009) investigate a new variant of beauty contest games (BCG) in which
players actions are strategic substitutes versus strategic complements and ¯nd that
chosen numbers are closer to rational play in the case of strategic substitutes.
In the LtFEs of Heemeijer et al. (2009), the (unknown) price generating rules
in the negative and positive feedback systems were respectively:










ht] ¡ 60] + ²t; negative feedback (6.1)










ht ¡ 60] + ²t; positive feedback (6.2)
where ²t is a random shock to the pricing rule. First we will consider positive and
negative feedback systems with small IID shocks ²t, ²t » N(0;0:25), and later on
with large permanent shocks.
A common feature of the positive and negative feedback systems (6.1) and (6.2)
is that both have the same RE equilibrium steady state p¤, with p¤ = 60 when the































































Figure 9: Negative (left panel) vs. positive (right panel) feedback experiments with
small IID shocks; prices (top panels), individual predictions (bottom panels) and
forecast errors (small panels).
sign of the slope of the linear map, 20=21 ¼ +0:95 resp. ¡20=21 ¼ ¡0:9514.
Figure 9 shows realized market prices as well as individual predictions in two
typical groups. A striking feature is that aggregate price behavior is very di®er-
ent in the positive versus negative feedback cases. In the negative feedback case,
the price relatively quickly settles down to the RE steady state price 60, while
in the positive feedback case, the market price oscillates slowly around its fun-
damental value. Individual forecasting behavior is also di®erent for the di®erent
feedback treatments: in the case of positive feedback, coordination of individual
forecasts occurs extremely quickly, within 2-3 periods. The coordination however
is on a \wrong" non-fundamental price. In contrast, in the negative feedback case
coordination of individual forecasts is slower and takes about 10 periods. More
persistence in heterogeneity of individual forecasts however ensures that, after 10
periods, the realized market price is very close to the RE benchmark of 60.
Can the heterogeneous expectations model of Section 5 explain these di®erent
outcomes in individual and aggregate behaviour? Figure 10 shows realized market
prices together with the simulated prices (left panels), and the corresponding evo-
lution of the fractions of the four strategies (right panels) of the heuristics switching
14In both treatments, the absolute value of the slopes is 0:95, implying in both cases that the
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Figure 10: Positive feedback (bottom panels) and negative feedback (top panels)
markets with small shocks. Realized and simulated prices (left panels) and corre-
sponding evolution of fractions of 4 strategies in heuristics switching model.
model with the same benchmark parameters as before, i.e. ¯ = 0:4;´ = 0:7;± = 0:9.
The model matches aggregate price behaviour in both the negative and positive
feedback treatment. Furthermore, the time series of the fractions of the di®erent
forecasting heuristics (Figure 10, right panels) provide an intuitive explanation of
why aggregate behavior is di®erent. In the negative feedback treatment, the adap-
tive expectations strategy performs best and within 20 periods it captures more
than 90% of the market, thus enforcing convergence towards the fundamental equi-
librium price. In contrast, in the positive feedback treatment the impact of the
strong trend-following rule (STR) quickly increases and it captures more than 75%
of the market after 15 periods. Thereafter, the impact of the STR rule gradually
declines, while the fraction of weak trend-followers (WTR) gradually increases due
to the fact that the STR-rule makes (somewhat) larger mistakes (especially at the
turning points) than the WTR-rule.
The di®erence in aggregate behavior is thus explained by the fact that trend
following rules are successful in a positive feedback environment reinforcing price
oscillations and persistent deviations from the fundamental equilibrium benchmark
price, while the trend-following rules are driven out by adaptive expectations in
35the case of negative feedback.








































































Figure 11: Positive feedback (bottom panels) and negative feedback (top panels)
markets with large permanent shocks to the equilibrium steady state level. Realized
and simulated prices (left panels) and corresponding evolution of fractions of the 4
strategies in heuristics switching model.
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Figure 12: Positive/Negative F eedback; Large Shocks Coordination & Price Discov-
ery; median absolute distance to RE fundamental price; median standard deviation
of individual predictions
Bao et al. (2010) recently ran similar LtFEs with large permanent shocks ²t to
the price generating mechanisms (6.1) and (6.2). These shocks have been chosen
such that, both in the negative and positive feedback treatments, the fundamental
36equilibrium price p¤ changes over time according to:
p¤
t = 56 0 · t · 21
p¤
t = 41 22 · t · 43
p¤
t = 62 44 · t · 65:
(6.3)
The purpose of these experiments was to investigate how the type of expectations
feedback may a®ect the speed of learning of a new steady state equilibrium price.
Figure 11 shows realized market prices together with the simulated market prices
(left panels), together with the evolution of the fractions of the four strategies
of the heuristics switching model (right panels) for a typical group of the nega-
tive feedback (top panels) and the positive feedback treatment (bottom panels).
The heuristics switching model is exactly the same as in Anufriev and Hommes
(2009), in the case of the asset pricing experiments (see Section 5), with the same
benchmark parameters as before, i.e. ¯ = 0:4;´ = 0:7;± = 0:9. As in the case
of small shocks, there is a striking di®erence between positive and negative feed-
back markets. In the negative feedback market, after each large shock the price
quickly (within 5 periods) settles down to the RE benchmark, while in the positive
feedback market the price slowly oscillates with persistent deviations from the RE
benchmark. The heuristics switching model matches both patterns quite nicely and
provides an intuitive, behavioral explanation why these di®erent aggregate patterns
occur. In the negative feedback market, trend following strategies perform poorly
and the adaptive expectations strategy quickly dominates the market (more than
50% within 10 periods) enforcing quick convergence to the RE benchmark after
each large shock. In contrast, in the positive feedback treatment, trend following
strategies perform well, the weak trend following rule dominates in the ¯rst 20
periods, while the strong trend following rule starts dominating after the ¯rst large
shock in period 22.
Figure 12 reveals some other striking features of aggregate price behavior and
individual forecasts. The left panel shows the time variation of the median dis-
tance to the RE benchmark price over all groups in both treatments. For the
37negative feedback treatment, after each large shock the distance spikes but con-
verges quickly back (within 5-6 periods) to 0, while for the positive feedback treat-
ment after each shock the distance to the RE benchmark shows a similar spike
but does not converge to 0 and only decreases slowly. The right panel shows how
the degree of heterogeneity, that is, the median standard deviation of individual
forecasts, changes over time. For the positive feedback treatment after each large
shock heterogeneity decreases very quickly and converges to (almost) 0 within 3-4
periods, while in the negative treatment heterogeneity is more persistent for about
10 periods after each large shock. One may summarize these results in saying that
in the positive feedback treatment individuals quickly coordinate on a common
prediction, but that coordination on the \wrong" non-fundamental price occurs.
On the other hand, in the negative feedback treatment coordination is slow, het-
erogeneity is more persistent but price convergence is quick. Stated di®erently,
positive feedback markets are characterized by quick coordination and slow price
discovery, while negative feedback markets are characterized by slow coordination,
more persistent heterogeneity and quick price discovery. See Bao et al. (2009) for
a more detailed discussion.
7 A New Keynesian Macro Model
As a ¯nal example, we brie°y discuss the LtFEs experiments in a standard New
Keynesian macro model of Assenza et al. (2009); see also Pfajfar and Santoro




t+1 ¡ '(it ¡ ¼
e
t+1) + gt ; (7.1)
¼t = ¸yt + ¯¼
e
t+1 + ut ; (7.2)
it = Á¼(¼t ¡ ¼) + ¼ ; (7.3)
38where yt and ye
t+1 are respectively the actual and the expected output gap at time t,
it is the nominal interest rate, ¼t and ¼e
t+1 are respectively the actual and expected
in°ation rates, ¼ is the target in°ation rate, ¸, ¾, ¯ and ' are positive coe±cients,
and gt and ut are (small) white noise shocks. The coe±cient Á¼ measures the
response of the nominal interest rate it to changes in the in°ation rate ¼t. Equation
(7.1) is the IS curve in which the actual output gap yt depends on the expected
output gap ye
t+1 and on the real interest rate it ¡ ¼e
t+1. Equation (7.2) is the
expectations-augmented New Keynesian Phillips curve according to which actual
in°ation depends on the actual output gap and expected in°ation. Finally, equation
(7.3) is the monetary policy rule implemented by the Central Bank in order to keep
in°ation at its target level ¼.
In the LtFEs of Assenza et al. (2009), two di®erent groups of 6 subjects have to
provide two-period ahead forecasts of the in°ation rate respectively the output gap
for 50 periods. Realized in°ation and realized output gap are determined by the
(average) individual expectations of two di®erent groups of 6 individuals. Subjects
only obtain qualitative information about the macro-economy, but they do not
know the underlying law of motion (7.1-7.3).
Figure 13: Learning to forecast experiment in New Keynesian Macro framework.
Left panel: time series of realized in°ation, individual in°ation forecasts, interest
rate and realized output gap. Right panel: time series of realized in°ation, interest
rate, realized output gap and individual forecasts of output gap. Parameter values:
Á¼ = 1:5, ...
Figure 13 shows time series of realized in°ation, output gap, interest rate to-











































































Figure 14: New Keynesian Macro Model: Simulations of heuristics switching model
gether with individual forecasts of in°ation and output gap. Both in°ation and
output gap exhibit dampened oscillations eventually converging to the RE bench-
mark steady state. An interesting feature of these experiments is that an aggressive
monetary policy described by a Taylor type interest rate rule that adjust the in-
terest rate more than one point for one in response to in°ation (with a coe±cient
Á¼ = 1:5) is able to stabilize heterogeneous expectations.
Figure 14 shows simulated time series of in°ation and output gap, together with
the fractions of the forecasting rules, of the benchmark heuristics switching model
of Anufriev and Hommes (2009). The same heuristics switching model is used for
both in°ation and output gap forecasts and the model ¯ts the experimental data
quite well. The patterns of the weight of the forecasting heuristics are quite similar
for in°ation and output, as one would expect since both time series are qualitatively
similar. The Learning Anchor and Adjustment (LAA) rule dominates most of the
time, with a peak of about 80% after 25 periods and the adaptive expectations rule
dominating in the last 10 periods when the economy stabilizes. There is a slight
di®erence in the initial phase, with the strong trend rule STR dominating in°ation
40forecasting in periods 5-10, picking up the stronger trend in in°ation.
8 Concluding Remarks
LtFEs can be used to test theories of expectations and learning in benchmark
model settings. LtFEs are Taylor made experiments to test exclusively the expec-
tations hypothesis, computerizing all other model assumptions. Di®erent outcomes
in aggregate behavior have been observed in di®erent market settings. To our best
knowledge, no homogeneous expectations model ¯ts all LtFEs across di®erent set-
tings. Quick convergence to the RE-benchmark only occurs in stable (i.e. stable
under naive expectations) cobweb/negative feedback markets.
Lab experiments suggest that heterogeneity is a crucial aspect of a theory of
expectations, because a heterogeneous expectations model can explain observed path
dependence in the same market environment as well as di®erent aggregate outcomes
across di®erent market settings.
A challenge to economic theory is to come up with a universal and plausible
theory of heterogeneous expectations. The fact that a simple heuristics switching
model ¯ts di®erent LtFEs gives some hope that a general heterogeneous expec-
tations hypothesis may explain individual expectations and aggregate outcomes
across di®erent market settings.
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